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Looking Back on the Sonderweg
Jürgen Kocka
C entral European History has opened its pages again and again to the controversialdebate about the so-called German Sonderweg. With that in mind, and on the occa-sion of this important journal’s fiftieth anniversary, the following essay presents some
very selective and personal thoughts on this topic. Although discussed and promoted much
less frequently now than in previous decades, and although there are understandable reasons
why it has left the center stage of scholarly debate, the approach to modern German history
signified by this problematic concept has not been disproven or become obsolete. But, con-
fronted by severe criticism, it has been—and can be—rethought and revised.
American voices and experiences have been important in the development of approaches
to German history frequently signified by the term Sonderweg—which, it should be noted at
the outset, has always been used much less frequently by scholars who sympathize oneway or
another with the approach it takes, than by those who criticize it.1 Among the intellectual
ancestors of the critical Sonderweg thesis were not only German authors—from Friedrich
Engels to Max Weber to Thomas Mann—but also at least one major American intellectual:
Thorstein Veblen.2 When this Sonderweg approach assumed a more precise shape and really
started to have an impact on the historical profession—even if it never became mainstream in
Germany itself—American experiences and voices again played an important role.3 It was
against the background of their experiences in the United States that scholars who had
fled from or been driven out of Germany in the 1930s (i.e., “émigré scholars” of the first
and second generations) decisively shaped the Sonderweg approach to German history,
which corresponded, after all, to fundamental experiences in their lives. Hans Rosenberg,
Ernst Fraenkel, Hajo Holborn, Felix Gilbert, George Mosse, Fritz Stern, and Georg Iggers
I want to express my thanks to Andrew Port for his comments and criticisms, as well as for his help in
making this text more readable.
1For a good introduction to the debate, see HelmutWalser Smith, “When the SonderwegDebate Left Us,”
German Studies Review 31, no. 2 (2008): 225-40. The following remarks are partly based on Jürgen Kocka,
“Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and Theory 38, no. 1
(1999): 40-51. That article contains detailed references not included in the present essay.
2Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1915).
Historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advocated a more positive variant of the
Sonderweg thesis, one that stressed the benefits and advantages of German history relative to “the West.”
This affirmative variant of the Sonderweg is not discussed in the following essay. On that, as well as on
many other important points that I cover here, see James J. Sheehan, “Paradigm Lost? The ‘Sonderweg’
Revisited,” in Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde et al.
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 150–60.
3It is not correct to assume that the Sonderweg thesis held a monopoly of sorts in German-language his-
toriography. See Edward Ross Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascim, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our
Discourse About Modernity”, Central European History (CEH) 37, no. 1 (2004): 1. On debates in the inter-
war period, see Annie Everett, “The Genesis of the Sonderweg,” International Social Science Review 91, no. 2
(2015) (https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=issr).
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are particularly well-known examples. They had escaped Nazi repression and persecution in
Central Europe, found a new home in the United States, and virtually owed their very sur-
vival to the fact that “the West,” and especially the United States, had been decisively differ-
ent fromGermany and Central Europe. The “German divergence from theWest”—as some
historians, like Gordon Craig, aptly paraphrased what others called the German Sonderweg, or
German “exceptionalism”—was an essential part of the life experience of these exile scholars.
It became a central concern of their intellectual lives, and sometimes of their professional
work as well.4
Some of us who later used the idea of a temporary German divergence from the West as
an intellectual cornerstone for comparative historical studies (e.g., scholars working in Berlin
and Bielefeld, particularly during the third quarter of the twentieth century) were influenced
by research stays in the United States, by close contacts with American colleagues and friends,
and by (usually) positive, sometimes idealized images of American (and English) history.
These experiences influenced the questions with which we approached the German past;
some of us even produced elaborate comparisons of certain topics in German and
American history. Later on, criticism of the Sonderweg approach, which became pronounced
in the 1980s, was also formulated, supported, and contested in a more lively manner in the
United States (and Great Britain) than anywhere else, except Germany itself. In other words,
America and the United Kingdom have been very present in the Sonderweg approach to
German history, as practiced in previous decades. The debate about the Sonderweg has primar-
ily been a German-Anglo-American debate, then—one in which historians from other
countries hardly participated.
It is important to specify what is meant by Sonderweg, since not everybody associates the
same meaning with the term—and also because there have been variations of the critical
Sonderweg argument that are untenable (e.g., the drawing of a straight line “from Luther to
Hitler”). On the basis of implicit and explicit comparisons with Western countries—
sometimes more broadly with “the West” as a whole—the Sonderweg argument tried to
provide answers to the question why Germany, unlike other (Western) countries during
the crisis of the interwar period, transformed into a radical, fascist dictatorship. It was in
the context of this basic scholarly concern that the critical Sonderweg argumentation
emerged, and it is only within this context that it makes sense. The argumentation identified
long-term structures and processes that were seen as having contributed to the collapse of the
Weimar Republic and to the triumph of National Socialism—in addition to, and in combi-
nation with, short-term factors, such as Germany’s defeat in World War I or the personality
of Adolf Hitler, and with supranational dimensions, e.g., the crisis of contemporary capital-
ism and the challenges of class conflict. More specifically, a finger was pointed at theweakness
of the German Bürgertum and the tenacious strength of “feudal” elites and traditions, at the
enduring impact of an old and powerful bureaucracy never challenged by a successful revo-
lution, at the strength of illiberal elements in German culture and everyday life, at the rela-
tively late formation of the German nation-state and the way this was achieved under the
leadership of Otto von Bismarck’s Prussia, as well as at the blocked and delayed transition
4For a penetrating case study, see William W. Hagen, “Descent of the Sonderweg: Hans Rosenberg’s
History of Old-Regime Prussia,” CEH 24, no. 1 (1991): 24-50. Also see Andreas Daum, Hartmut
Lehmann, and James J. Sheehan, eds., The Second Generation: Émigrés from Nazi Germany as Historians
(New York: Berghahn, 2016).
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to a parliamentary system of government. The existence or the particular strength of these
factors were interpreted as peculiarities of German history that had made the development
of liberal democracy there especially difficult—something that ultimately facilitated the
rise of National Socialism. To a large extent, scholars identified these factors by looking
into earlier periods of German history, particularly Imperial Germany from 1870 to
World War I. But the detrimental effects of these traditions had to be traced to the
Weimar Republic as well: their causal weight and explanatory power related more to the
weakness and breakdown of Weimar than to the victory and specific characteristics of
National Socialism.
It later became clear that the Sonderweg thesis—or, rather, Sonderweg approach (I prefer the
second term because I prefer to think of a specific approach to a period of German history
rather than of fixed results)—had certain implications that could be explicitly used to inter-
pret German, especially West German, history after 1945 as well. It could lead to the thesis
that the Nazi dictatorship and its catastrophic consequences had not only brought the
German Sonderweg to its low point, but also contributed to creating preconditions for its
demise—a step-by-step process after World War II in the Federal Republic of Germany.
For, despite the existence of two, in many ways opposite, postwar German states, and
despite the burden of the legacy of the pre-1945 period, the Federal Republic managed
to become a relatively “normal”Western country that did not define itself anymore in con-
trast to and as distant from “the West”—and that did not return to anything like a German
Sonderweg, even after absorbing the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and again becom-
ing a relatively sovereign state in 1990.5 One needs to emphasize this dimension of the
Sonderweg interpretation because it helps to understand why its supporters have defended it
so vigorously against various types of criticism. In the views and the writings of German
authors, the self-critical Sonderweg approach (or parts of it) was frequently connected to a
strong commitment to, and hope for, the development of a democratic Germany after
Hitler and the Holocaust, as well as to various attempts to build a new Germany, not least
by “reconstructing” its history and setting it apart from its past. This mixture of scholarly
and political concerns surfaced during the so-called Historikerstreit of the mid-1980s.6
Sketched in such an abbreviated and generalized way, the Sonderweg argument may appear
as overly structural, schematic, and “constructed” (konstruiert) to many readers today.
However, it should be noted that nearly all authors who have somehow contributed to, sym-
pathized with, or used the Sonderweg approach have done so by dealing only with specific
parts of the overall thesis, and by posing and examining specific questions and topics (e.g.,
a comparison of British and German parliamentarism in the 1920s) that were then empirically
5See the interpretations of German history after World War II by two historians who subscribed to the
Sonderweg approach with respect to earlier periods of German history: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche
Geschichte, vol. 5: Bundesrepublik und DDR 1949-1990 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008); Heinrich August
Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte, Bd. 2: Vom “Dritten Reich” bis zur
Wiedervereinigung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000).
6See Peter Baldwin, ed.,Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’Debate (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1990); Andrew I. Port, ed., “Holocaust Scholarship and Politics in the Public Sphere: Reexamining
the Causes, Consequences, and Controversy of theHistorikerstreit and the Goldhagen Debate: A Forum with
Gerrit Dworok, Richard J. Evans, Mary Fulbrook, Wendy Lower, A. Dirk Moses, Jeffrey K. Olick, and
Timothy D. Snyder,” CEH 50, no. 3 (2017): 375–403.
REVERIES AND REVERBERATIONS 139
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938918000183
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. GESIS - Leibniz-Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften, on 10 Oct 2019 at 10:18:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
developed and contextualized.7 This was usually not presented as evidence in favor of a
Sonderweg thesis per se (in fact, most of these autors did not use the term at all); instead,
they used this approach (or parts of it) as a way in which to get at larger issues.
Criticisim of the Sonderweg thesis has been manifold, substantial, and effective. It has been
partly of a methodological nature, leading to interesting debates about the logic of historical
comparison and, for instance, about the problematic assumption of a “normal path” from
which Germany allegedly deviated.8 The criticism has been empirical as well. The
Sonderweg thesis challenged historians to do extensive research and produce results that
would eventually modify central parts of the Sonderweg approach, e.g., its interpretation of
the political system of the Kaiserreich as authoritarian and “premodern”—and thus more or
less doomed to fail.9 The Sonderweg thesis also triggered extensive comparative research,
the results of which ultimately demanded basic revision of central parts of the Sonderweg
thesis. To cite the most important example: detailed investigations showed, for one, that aris-
tocratic influence on the upper bourgeoisie was probably not greater in late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century Germany than it was in many other parts of Europe, and, second,
that the social distance between the nobility and the bourgeosie remained more clearly
drawn in the German Empire than in contemporary France and Britain.10 As a consequence,
the long cherished “feudalization” thesis, which had been important since the nineteenth
century for emphasizing the particular weakness of the German bourgeosie, lost much of
its explanative power.
7See, e. g., Gerhard A. Ritter, Deutscher und britischer Parlamentarismus (Tübingen: Mohr, 1962). For new
insights on this topic, see Hartwin Spenkuch, “Vergleichsweise besonders? Politisches System und
Strukturen Preussens als Kern des deutschen Sonderwegs,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29, no. 2 (2003):
262–93; Michael Kreuzer, “Parliamentarization and the Question of German Exceptionalism,
1867–1918,” CEH 36, no. 3 (2003): 327–57.
8This was one of several central arguments in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley,The Peculiarities of German
History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984);
a slimmer German version had appeared in 1980 as Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung. Die gescheiterte
bürgerliche Revolution von 1848 (Berlin: Ullstein, 1980). On the origins and impact of this important book,
see the interviews with the authors that was published as a “Forum” in German History 22, no. 2 (2004):
229-45. It was here (p. 233) that David Blackbourn compared the Sonderweg thesis to Frederick Jackson
Turner’s “Frontier Thesis.” There are certainly less significant intellectual constructs with which to be com-
pared. For a discussion of related problems of comparison, see Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt,
“Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History,” in Comparative
and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and
Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn, 2010), 1-30. Also see Kenneth F. Ledford, “Comparing
Comparisons: Disciplines and the Sonderweg,” CEH 36, no. 3 (2003): 367-74.
9To cite just one important contribution: Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and
Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Also see the exchange
between Anderson and Volker R. Berghahn in CEH 35, no. 1 (2002): 75-90.
10See Hartmut Kaelble, “Wie feudal waren die Unternehmer im Kaiserreich?,” in Beiträge zur quantita-
tiven deutschen Unternehmergeschichte, ed. Richard Tilly (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985), 148-74; Dolores
L. Augustine, Patricians and Parvenus: Wealth and High Society in Wilhelmine Germany (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994). These findings correspond to the results of a major comparative research project
conducted in Bielefeld in 1986-1987 on the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Europe; this is documented
in Jürgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell, eds., Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Berg
Publishers, 1993). Geoff Eley correctly emphasizes that the criticism of the Sonderweg approach, especially
in the book he coauthored with David Blackbourn (see note 8), was a stimulus—one among several, it
should be emphasized—that motivated this large-scale research project; see p. 235 of the 2004 German
History forum cited in note 8.
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There were other changes that relativized the Sonderweg approach, not least as a result of
new focuses that became paramount in the study of National Socialism. Several questions had
long been central to the Sonderweg approach: “how could it happen, why did it happen, and
why did it happen in Germany?” The breakdown of democracy and the institutionalization
of the Nazi dictatorship in the years around 1933 were, as a result, central as explananda. Later
on, scholars became more interested in the processes of radicalization of German fascism, as
well as in its destructive and violent strategies and operations, in the perpetrators and victims,
as well as in the Holocaust itself. For such investigations, the later years of the regime became
more important.11
The Sonderweg approach continued an old tradition of German self-comparison with its
Western neighbors—or, more generally, with “the West.” But, since the end of the East-
West division of Europe in 1989-1991, we have become accustomed to a more balanced
“Europeanization” of the perspectives we adopt; this includes comparisons with neighbors
and regions in the East. This has had important consequences: when compared with east-
central, southeastern, or east European cases, the German bourgeoisie does not look weak
at all, but rather strong. From the perspective of the eastern parts of Europe during the interwar
period, where the transition from democracy to dictatorship was the rule, the German record
also looks less exceptional. As this suggests, basic elements of the Sonderweg approach need to be
modified when German history is placed within broader comparative frameworks.
Comprehensive, comparative European and global historical approaches of this nature tend
to relativize the Sonderweg thesis, leading perforce to different approaches to German history.12
∗∗∗
This essay began by emphasizing the fact that the critical Sonderweg thesis had first been pro-
moted by a generation of scholars whose life experiences had led them to ask urgent ques-
tions that the Sonderweg approach seemed to answer. Since then, new generations of historians
have asked other questions and come to expect different answers. The tendency to interpret
German history sub specie 1933 has declined, and, with it, the relevance of the Sonderweg
thesis. The foregoing remarks have also stressed the connection between the Sonderweg inter-
pretation of modern German history and the postwar political commitment in the Federal
Republic to overcome the traditional distance between Germany and the West, i.e.,
between Germany and Western values, constitutional principles, and ways of life. One
can argue that this has been achieved, by and large, and that the historical profession has con-
tributed to this fortunate outcome by helping to develop a relatively sober historical self-
understanding in the Federal Republic—something towhich the Sonderweg view has strongly
contributed. The German Sonderweg seems to have come to an end in real or actual history—
though there may be some remaining elements that, under changing circumstances, could
reappear in new guises. At the same time, “the West” has become a more problematic
frame of reference than it used to be or appeared to be—and that was true even before
11See HelmutWalser Smith, “The Vanishing Point of GermanHistory: An Essay on Perspective,”History
and Memory 17, no. 1/2 (2005): 269-95.
12See Matthew Fitzpatrick, “The Pre-History of the Holocaust? The Sonderweg and the Historikerstreit
Debates and the Abject Colonial Past,”CEH 41, no. 3 (2008): 477-503. By contrast, the Sonderweg approach
is used to criticize unilinear concepts in postcolonial studies. See Jie-Hyun Lim, “A Postcolonial reading of
the Sonderweg: Marxist Historicism Revisited,” Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 2 (2014): 280-94.
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Donald Trump became president of the United States. The constellation has, in short,
changed in ways that make the Sonderweg approach seem less compelling and relevant.13
Leaving aside the merits and problematic aspects of its individual elements, the Sonderweg
approach has made German history—the way historians deal with German history—more
comparative, and that is an important advance.14More specifically, it has spawned productive
discussions and empirical research. The methodological and empirical criticisms it had to face
led to its eventual clarification, revision, and relativization. Its claims have been carefully
reduced in scope, and the arguments made by its advocates have become more nuanced.15
But central elements of the Sonderweg thesis have nevertheless survived.16 The question
why Germany turned into a radical, fascist-totalitarian dictatorship, while other comparable
countries did not, remains a central question—and not just for historians of Germany. It is
certainly not convincing to identify the general contradictions of capitalism at the time, or
the perils of modernity in general, as major causes since countries that were at least as capi-
talistic and modern as Germany—again, Britain and the United States come to mind—did
not become fascist and totalitarian. The Sonderweg approach holds elements of an answer to
such questions—one that continues to be convincing.17 But contexts change, the guiding
interests of scholars shift, new questions and answers take center stage. The Sonderweg
approach has not been disproved but rather relativized. Its relevance has declined, and its
position within the field of Central European studies has become more marginal. It can
neither be predicted nor excluded that this process will be revised at some point in the future.
FREE UNIVERSITY BERLIN
13For comments by a staunch defender of the Sonderweg approach who has long advocated the
“Westernization” of Germany, see Heinrich August Winkler, Zerbricht der Westen? Über die gegenwärtige
Krise in Europa und Amerika (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2017).
14See Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Historische Komparatistik in der internationalen Geschichtsschreibung,”
in Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde et al. (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006): 137-49 (esp. p. 143).
15A comparison of Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s treatment of the German Empire in Das Deutsche Kaiserreich
1871–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973) with his Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Bd. 3:
Von der “Deutschen Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges, 1849–1914 (Munich:
C. H. Beck, 1995) shows that the author’s use of the Sonderweg approach became much more subtle and
nuanced over time.
16As formulated in Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison,” 45-46. For a more detailed discussion,
see idem, “Bürgertum und Sonderweg,” in Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Bürgertums, ed. Peter Lundgreen
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 93–110.
17See Volker Berghahn, “German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler,”German Studies
Review 40, no. 1 (2017): 147-62 (esp. p. 158).
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